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US: unemployment of recent graduates and peers without a degree

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Unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed)% of labour force5.4 % of labour force 2025
02.557.5
Unemployment: young workers aged 22-27 without a bachelor's degree (NY Fed)% of labour force7.3 % of labour force 2025
1015
Unemployment: all workers aged 16-65 (NY Fed)% of labour force4.1 % of labour force 2025
468
actual

Without JavaScript you see a ready view: United States — Unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed), Unemployment: young workers aged 22-27 without a bachelor's degree (NY Fed), Unemployment: all workers aged 16-65 (NY Fed), 1990–2025. Every country has its own page that works without JavaScript (list below); the data is in the API.

How the indicators changed

  • Unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed): 3.6 % of labour force in 1990 → 5.4 % of labour force in 2025 (+1.8 pp). Peak: 8 % of labour force in 2020; the latest value is 32% lower.
  • Unemployment: young workers aged 22-27 without a bachelor's degree (NY Fed): 7.9 % of labour force in 1990 → 7.3 % of labour force in 2025 (−0.6 pp). Peak: 15.5 % of labour force in 2010; the latest value is 53% lower. The trend broke around 2004 and 2010: −0.16 → +1.1 → −0.51 a year.
  • Unemployment: all workers aged 16-65 (NY Fed): 5.3 % of labour force in 1990 → 4.1 % of labour force in 2025 (−1.2 pp). Peak: 9.5 % of labour force in 2010; the latest value is 57% lower. The trend broke around 2000 and 2010: −0.3 → +0.37 → −0.28 a year.

What changed at the same time

  • The fastest rise of "Unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed)" was in 2000–2010: 2.8 % of labour force → 7 % of labour force. Over the same years: unemployment: young workers aged 22-27 without a bachelor's degree (NY Fed) 6.3 % of labour force → 15.5 % of labour force; unemployment: all workers aged 16-65 (NY Fed) 3.8 % of labour force → 9.5 % of labour force.
  • Over the last 10 years (2015–2025): unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed) 4.8 % of labour force → 5.4 % of labour force; unemployment: young workers aged 22-27 without a bachelor's degree (NY Fed) 9.9 % of labour force → 7.3 % of labour force; unemployment: all workers aged 16-65 (NY Fed) 5.2 % of labour force → 4.1 % of labour force.

How the indicators relate

  • Unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed) and unemployment: young workers aged 22-27 without a bachelor's degree (NY Fed) (1990–2025, 36 years): levels are strongly related, in the same direction (r = 0.82); year-to-year changes are related too (r = 0.94). Changes line up from year to year too, which is more than a shared trend.
  • Unemployment: recent college graduates aged 22-27 (NY Fed) and unemployment: all workers aged 16-65 (NY Fed) (1990–2025, 36 years): levels are strongly related, in the same direction (r = 0.78); year-to-year changes are related too (r = 0.94). Changes line up from year to year too, which is more than a shared trend.

Moving together in time does not prove a cause: incomes, cities, education and the era itself act on many indicators at once. These observations suggest where to look, not what causes what.

Key findings

  • UN projection of 2024: in 33 of 42 countries that already report 2024–2025 data, births are below the medium variant; in 8, below the lower bound of the 95% interval.
  • Japan: 709k births in 2024 (including children of foreign nationals). Even the latest official projection (IPSS 2023, medium) expected this level only in 2042, 18 years later. An earlier projection (IPSS 2002, medium) expected it in 2045.
  • Taiwan: 108k births in 2025. Even the latest official projection (NDC 2024, medium) expected this level only in 2036, 11 years later. An earlier projection (NDC 2016, medium) expected it in 2057.
  • China: 7.92M births in 2025. Even the latest official projection (UN WPP 2024, medium) expected this level only in 2050, 25 years later. An earlier projection (UN WPP 2022, medium) expected it in 2054.
  • United States: 1.60 children per woman in 2024. The SSA 2015 projection assumed 2.04 for that year, a gap of −22%.
  • South Korea: 0.80 children per woman in 2025. Projections made before 2020 expected 1.00–1.38 for 2025, while the 2021 and 2023 projections turned out lower than reality: fertility rose slightly in 2024–2025. Errors go both ways.
  • World: 67% of people live in countries with fertility below replacement (2.1), 31% below 1.5. World population is still growing: the UN expects a peak of about 10.3B in 2084.

All forecast-vs-actual checks →

How it works

  • A source for every number. Links go to the primary publication: the statistical office, the UN, the projection archive.
  • Forecast against fact. Next to a figure: what official projections expected for it and how far reality departed.
  • Association is not cause. Moving together in time suggests where to look; the observations under the chart always say so and check a link not only in levels but also in year-to-year changes.
  • Open data. Every table is available as CSV and JSON to check, recompute and reuse.
  • For programs and AI agents. The same data through an API and an MCP server, no page scraping: how to connect.

Data as of 7 October 2026

Country pages

Each country has a page that works without JavaScript: key indicators, observations, past UN and IMF forecasts against actual data, every series with source links. Countries →