Official forecasts of fertility, population and the economy, checked against what happened. Errors go both ways: in ageing countries fertility projections turned out too optimistic again and again, while some populations grew faster than expected. This page shows where, by how much and in which direction.
countries with 2024–2025 data: fewer births than the UN 2024 medium variant; 8 below the 95% interval
Past UN revisions: births
51%
of country × revision checks (1998–2022): the outcome below the projection; median gap 0%
IMF: next-year GDP growth
−1.1 pp
mean error (actual minus forecast) over 6,404 forecasts; the outcome below the forecast in 57%
UN projection of 2024: in 33 of 42 countries that already report 2024–2025 data, births are below the medium variant; in 8, below the lower bound of the 95% interval.
Japan: 709k births in 2024 (including children of foreign nationals). Even the latest official projection (IPSS 2023, medium) expected this level only in 2042, 18 years later. An earlier projection (IPSS 2002, medium) expected it in 2045.
Taiwan: 108k births in 2025. Even the latest official projection (NDC 2024, medium) expected this level only in 2036, 11 years later. An earlier projection (NDC 2016, medium) expected it in 2057.
China: 7.92M births in 2025. Even the latest official projection (UN WPP 2024, medium) expected this level only in 2050, 25 years later. An earlier projection (UN WPP 2022, medium) expected it in 2054.
United States: 1.60 children per woman in 2024. The SSA 2015 projection assumed 2.04 for that year, a gap of −22%.
South Korea: 0.80 children per woman in 2025. Projections made before 2020 expected 1.00–1.38 for 2025, while the 2021 and 2023 projections turned out lower than reality: fertility rose slightly in 2024–2025. Errors go both ways.
World: 67% of people live in countries with fertility below replacement (2.1), 31% below 1.5. World population is still growing: the UN expects a peak of about 10.3B in 2084.
World births
millions per year; UN estimates 1950–2023 and projection variants to 2100
UN estimates
UN medium variant
UN low variant
UN 95% interval
In-depth cases
For each case: the archive of official projections and the actual data. The table shows what each projection expected for the latest actual year, what happened, and when the projection expected today's level.
Demography
IPSS 2002, medium
IPSS 2006, medium
IPSS 2012, medium
IPSS 2017, medium
IPSS 2023, medium
Actual (MHLW)
Japan: births — five generations of official projections
IPSS medium variants 2002–2023 vs actual (all births in Japan incl. foreigners). The 2006 projection ran below actual for years; since 2022 reality is below every projection.
Each new projection started from the current level and assumed a rise. In 2025 the actual was 1.14 vs 1.27 (medium) and 1.12 (low) in the 2023 projection.
South Korea: births — Statistics Korea projections vs actual
The 2011 projection expected 449k births in 2023; actual was 230k. The 2023 projection was too low instead: 218k for 2025 vs 254k actual. Projected births are July–June, actual are calendar years.
2025 births were 107.8k: 40% below the 2016 projection and 17% below the one published in 2024. The 100k mark was expected in 2054 by the 2020–2022 editions; the new edition says 2026.
China: the promised baby boom after the one-child policy
Officials expected 17–19 million births a year in 2016–2020 and a TFR of 1.8 by 2020. Actual: 12 million in 2020 and 7.92 million in 2025; the population peak expected around 2030 came in 2021.
UN revisions 2010–2019 expected India to fall below replacement in 2025–2035. The SRS shows 2.0 already in 2020. Values for 2010–2019 are five-year averages.
USA: fertility in Social Security reports vs actual
Social Security trustees kept long-run fertility at 2.0 until the 2023 report; the 2015 report expected 2.04 in 2024 — actual 1.60. Only in 2026 was it cut to 1.75.
The 2012 projection expected 4.41 million births in 2024; actual 3.63 million. The 2060 population projection fell from 420 million (2012) to 364 million (2023).
Australia: fertility in Treasury Intergenerational Reports
The 2010 and 2015 reports assumed 1.9; actual 1.48. The long-run assumption fell from 1.62 to 1.34 only in the 2026 report. Financial years, plotted at the end year.
Finland: births — Statistics Finland projections vs actual
Each projection froze the latest fertility rate. The 2012 projection expected 60.8k births in 2024; there were 43.7k. Births are rising slightly in 2025–2026.
Russia: fertility — Rosstat projections, targets and actual
Targets: 1.87 by 2020, then 1.7 by 2024; actual in 2024 was 1.40. New targets: 1.6 by 2030 and 1.8 by 2036. Since spring 2025 Rosstat has not published monthly birth data.
7 projections of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, Series B) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 7, above in 3. The largest miss: ABS 1999 expected 240k for 2021; the outcome was 305k (+27.2%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Actual (the Treasury's series, financial years July–June)
Australia: fertility — Intergenerational Report assumptions vs actual
children per woman
6 projections of the Australian Treasury's Intergenerational Reports (IGR) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 5 of 6, above in 1. The largest miss: IGR 2010 expected 1.90 for 2025; the outcome was 1.52 (−20.0%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
New Zealand: fertility — Stats NZ projections vs actual
children per woman
9 projections of Stats NZ checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 9 of 9, above in 0. The largest miss: Stats NZ 2011 expected 1.93 for 2026; the outcome was 1.51 (−21.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
New Zealand: population — Stats NZ projections vs actual
thousand persons
9 projections of Stats NZ checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 9, above in 7. The largest miss: Stats NZ 2004 expected 4.73M for 2026; the outcome was 5.36M (+13.3%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
5 projections of IBGE (the Brazilian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 5, above in 1. The largest miss: IBGE 2004 expected 223.1M for 2022; the outcome was 210.9M (−5.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
5 projections of IBGE (the Brazilian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 5, above in 1. The largest miss: IBGE 2001 expected 2.06 for 2023; the outcome was 1.57 (−23.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
IBGE 2024 estimates (corrected for under-registration)
Brazil: births — IBGE projections vs actual
thousand births a year
5 projections of IBGE (the Brazilian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 5, above in 1. The largest miss: IBGE 2004 expected 3.42M for 2023; the outcome was 2.54M (−25.7%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
4 projections of INE Chile checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 4, above in 3. The largest miss: INE 2004 expected 19.01M for 2024; the outcome was 19.9M (+4.7%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Actual (INE vital statistics, calendar years; the 2018 projection uses July–June years)
Chile: fertility — INE projections vs actual
children per woman
2 projections of INE Chile checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: INE 2018 expected 1.58 for 2025; the outcome was 0.99 (−37.3%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Actual (INE, corrected births; the 2018 projection uses July–June years)
Chile: births — INE projections vs actual
thousand births a year
2 projections of INE Chile checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: INE 2018 expected 235k for 2025; the outcome was 147k (−37.7%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
5 projections of DANE (the Colombian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 5, above in 1. The largest miss: DANE 1998 expected 53.18M for 2015; the outcome was 46.31M (−12.9%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
INDEC estimates from the 2010 and 2022 censuses (1 July, corrected for undercount)
Argentina: population — INDEC projections vs the censuses
thousand persons
3 projections of INDEC (the Argentine statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 3, above in 2. The largest miss: INDEC 1994 expected 45.11M for 2022; the outcome was 46.14M (+2.3%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
INEI estimates for 30 June (to 2019) and the 2025 census (corrected for undercount)
Peru: population — INEI projections vs actual
thousand persons
4 projections of INEI (the Peruvian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 4, above in 0. The largest miss: INEI 2001 expected 35.73M for 2025; the outcome was 34.16M (−4.4%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
The 2010 and 2020 censuses and SUPAS 2015 and 2025 surveys (BPS, at their own dates)
Indonesia: population — BPS and Bappenas projections vs the censuses
thousand persons
3 projections of BPS and Bappenas (Indonesia) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 3, above in 2. The largest miss: Bappenas 2018 expected 282.5M for 2025; the outcome was 284.7M (+0.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
2 projections of DOSM (the Malaysian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: DOSM 2016 expected 36.45M for 2026; the outcome was 34.39M (−5.7%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population in the DOPA house register, 31 December
Thailand: population — NESDC projections vs the house register
thousand persons
2 projections of NESDC (Thailand) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: NESDC 2019 expected 67.01M for 2024; the outcome was 65.95M (−1.6%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population on 1 April (GSO/NSO censuses and surveys)
Viet Nam: population — GSO projections vs actual
thousand persons
3 projections of GSO (the Vietnamese statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 0 of 3, above in 3. The largest miss: GSO 2016 expected 99.93M for 2025; the outcome was 102.1M (+2.2%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
3 projections of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 3 of 3, above in 0. The largest miss: TÜİK 2018 expected 2.09 for 2025; the outcome was 1.42 (−32.0%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
3 projections of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 3 of 3, above in 0. The largest miss: TÜİK 2018 expected 1.32M for 2025; the outcome was 895k (−32.4%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population in the ADNKS address register, 31 December (Syrians under temporary protection not included)
Türkiye: population — TÜİK projections vs the register
thousand persons
3 projections of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 3, above in 1. The largest miss: TÜİK 2018 expected 88.84M for 2025; the outcome was 86.09M (−3.1%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
The 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2024 censuses (PSA, at their own dates)
Philippines: population — PSA projections vs the censuses
thousand persons
4 projections of NSO and PSA (the Philippine statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 4 of 4, above in 0. The largest miss: NSO 2006 expected 111.8M for 2020; the outcome was 109M (−2.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
CONAPO 2023 estimates for 1 July (corrected for census omission)
Mexico: population — CONAPO projections vs actual
thousand persons
4 projections of CONAPO (Mexico's National Population Council) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 0 of 4, above in 4. The largest miss: CONAPO 2006 expected 115.1M for 2019; the outcome was 127.2M (+10.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
ENDES survey (INEI): fertility over the three years before the interview
Peru: fertility — INEI projections vs surveys
children per woman
2 projections of INEI (the Peruvian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: INEI 2019 expected 2.10 for 2025; the outcome was 1.70 (−19.0%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
CONAPO 2023 estimates (all births, corrected for under-registration)
Mexico: births — CONAPO projections vs actual
thousand births a year
4 projections of CONAPO (Mexico's National Population Council) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 4, above in 2. The largest miss: CONAPO 2006 expected 1.83M for 2019; the outcome was 2.15M (+17.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population on 1 July from the 2004, 2014 and 2024 censuses (HCP)
Morocco: population — HCP projections vs the censuses
thousand persons
3 projections of HCP (the Moroccan statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 3, above in 2. The largest miss: HCP 2017 expected 37.37M for 2024; the outcome was 36.76M (−1.6%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population at the end of the year (CBS; the 2022 census lowered the level by 119 thousand)
Israel: population — CBS projections vs actual
thousand persons
4 projections of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 4, above in 3. The largest miss: CBS 2008 expected 8.77M for 2020; the outcome was 9.29M (+5.9%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population, GASTAT series based on the 2022 census
Saudi Arabia: population — development plans vs actual
thousand persons
3 projections of the Ministry of Economy and Planning's development plans and GASTAT (Saudi Arabia) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 3, above in 2. The largest miss: MEP 2005 expected 29.86M for 2024; the outcome was 35.3M (+18.2%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
The 2006, 2011 and 2016 censuses and intercensal estimates (Statistical Centre of Iran)
Iran: population — Statistical Centre projections vs the censuses
thousand persons
2 projections of the Statistical Centre of Iran checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 2, above in 1. The largest miss: SCI 2009 expected 74.73M for 2010; the outcome was 74.16M (−0.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population inside Egypt on 1 July, CAPMAS estimates
Egypt: population — CAPMAS projections vs actual
thousand persons
2 projections of CAPMAS (the Egyptian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: CAPMAS 2019 expected 111M for 2025; the outcome was 107.9M (−2.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Registered births (ONS; from 2020 without the correction for under-registration)
Algeria: births — ONS projections vs actual
thousand births a year
3 projections of ONS Algeria checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 3 of 3, above in 0. The largest miss: ONS 2018 expected 954k for 2023; the outcome was 895k (−6.2%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Singapore: population — the 2013 White Paper vs actual
thousand persons
2 projections of the 2013 Singapore Population White Paper checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 2, above in 0. The largest miss: White Paper 2013 (high end) expected 6M for 2020; the outcome was 5.69M (−5.2%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population on 1 January (Rosstat; from 2012 recalculated after the 2020 census, without the regions annexed in 2022)
Russia: population — Rosstat projections vs actual
thousand persons
7 projections of Rosstat checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 5 of 7, above in 2. The largest miss: Rosstat 2015 expected 148.3M for 2025; the outcome was 146.1M (−1.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Population on 1 January without Crimea and Sevastopol (difference of Rosstat series; projections before 2015 did not include them)
Russia: population — Rosstat projections of 2007-2014 vs actual
thousand persons
5 projections of Rosstat made in 2007-2014 checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 5, above in 4. The largest miss: Rosstat 2007 expected 136.1M for 2025; the outcome was 143.7M (+5.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Live births (Rosstat; 2024 operational; with Crimea from 2014)
Russia: births — Rosstat projections of 2008-2023 vs actual
thousand births a year
12 projections of Rosstat checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 11 of 12, above in 1. The largest miss: Rosstat 2017 expected 1.64M for 2024; the outcome was 1.22M (−25.6%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Total fertility rate (Rosstat, 2025 yearbook; 2011-2021 recalculated after the 2020 census)
Russia: fertility — Rosstat projections of 2007-2023 vs actual
children per woman
12 projections of Rosstat checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 11 of 12, above in 1. The largest miss: Rosstat 2017 expected 1.87 for 2024; the outcome was 1.40 (−25.0%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Total fertility rate (Derzhstat; from 2014 without Crimea and the occupied parts of Donbas)
Ukraine: fertility — the 2006 projection vs actual
children per woman
3 projections of the Ptoukha Institute of Demography with the State Statistics Committee (2006; variants of one projection) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 2 of 3, above in 1. The largest miss: IDSS 2006 (low) expected 0.89 for 2021; the outcome was 1.16 (+30.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Permanent population on 1 January (Derzhstat; whole territory, to 2014)
Ukraine: population — the 2006 projection vs actual to 2014
thousand persons
3 projections of the Ptoukha Institute of Demography with the State Statistics Committee (2006; variants of one projection) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 0 of 3, above in 3. The largest miss: IDSS 2006 (low) expected 43.22M for 2014; the outcome was 45.25M (+4.7%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Ukraine: births — the 2006 projection vs actual to 2013
thousand births a year
3 projections of the Ptoukha Institute of Demography with the State Statistics Committee (2006; variants of one projection) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 0 of 3, above in 3. The largest miss: IDSS 2006 (low) expected 366k for 2013; the outcome was 504k (+37.5%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Mid-year population (RZS, without Kosovo; from 2022 based on the 2022 census)
Serbia: population — the 2014 projection vs actual
thousand persons
3 projections of the Statistical Office of Serbia (2014; variants of one projection) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 3 of 3, above in 0. The largest miss: RZS 2014 (medium) expected 6.95M for 2021; the outcome was 6.83M (−1.7%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Mid-year population (DZS, 2021-census basis; the projection is for 1 January)
Croatia: population — the 2011 projection vs actual
thousand persons
3 projections of the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (2011; variants of one projection) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 3 of 3, above in 0. The largest miss: DZS 2011 (high) expected 4.38M for 2025; the outcome was 3.88M (−11.6%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
6 principal ONS and GAD projections against the facts over the years each has covered: net migration was higher than expected in 5 of 6. The largest under-projection of migration: GAD 2004 expected +3.23M for 2005–2025, the outcome was +6.52M. The other way: ONS 2022 expected +2.26M for 2023–2025, the outcome was +1.8M. The first projected years often equal the then provisional estimate; recent facts will be revised again.
Germany: net migration — Destatis projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
5 Destatis coordinated projections (variant W2) against the facts over the years each has covered: net migration was higher than expected in 5 of 5. The largest under-projection of migration: Destatis 2009 expected +2.36M for 2009–2025, the outcome was +7.86M. The first projected years often equal the then provisional estimate; recent facts will be revised again.
US: net immigration — CBO projections vs CBO estimates
thousand persons a year
5 CBO projections against the facts over the years each has covered: net migration was higher than expected in 4 of 5. The largest under-projection of migration: CBO, Mar 2021 expected +3.85M for 2021–2025, the outcome was +10.6M. The other way: CBO, Jan 2024 expected +5.9M for 2024–2025, the outcome was +2.68M. The two official estimates disagree: for 2022–2023 CBO counts +6.63M (calendar years), the Census Bureau +3.94M (July-June years). The first projected years often equal the then provisional estimate; recent facts will be revised again.
Census Bureau estimates (July-June years; 2011-2020 Vintage 2020, from 2021 Vintage 2025)
US: net international migration — Census Bureau projections vs its estimates
thousand persons a year
5 Census Bureau projections against the facts over the years each has covered: net migration was higher than expected in 3 of 5. The largest under-projection of migration: Census 2012 expected +11.52M for 2013–2025, the outcome was +14.94M. The other way: Census 2008 expected +21.52M for 2011–2025, the outcome was +16.6M. The first projected years often equal the then provisional estimate; recent facts will be revised again.
Canada: population growth — Statistics Canada projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
4 Statistics Canada projections (medium scenario M1) against the facts over the years each has covered: the population grew more than expected in 4 of 4. The largest under-projection of population growth: StatCan 2019 expected +2.85M for 2020–2026, the outcome was +4.18M. The first projected years often equal the then provisional estimate; recent facts will be revised again.
Australia: net overseas migration — Centre for Population projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
5 projections of the Australian Government Centre for Population against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 4 of 5. The largest miss: Population Statement 2020 expected +566k for 2020–2025; the outcome was +1.58M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
Australia: net overseas migration — ABS projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
7 projections of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, Series B) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 6 of 7. The largest miss: ABS 1999 expected +2.38M for 2000–2025; the outcome was +5.39M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
Australia: net overseas migration — Intergenerational Report assumptions vs actual
thousand persons a year
6 projections of the Australian Treasury's Intergenerational Reports (IGR) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 6 of 6. The largest miss: IGR 2002 expected +2.07M for 2003–2025; the outcome was +5.04M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
New Zealand: net migration — Stats NZ projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
9 projections of Stats NZ against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 8 of 9. The largest miss: Stats NZ 2004 expected +195k for 2005–2026; the outcome was +630k. The office will revise the latest facts again.
IBGE 2024 estimates (model-based: there is no direct count)
Brazil: net migration — IBGE projections vs IBGE estimates
thousand persons a year
5 projections of IBGE (the Brazilian statistical office) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 0 of 5. The largest miss: IBGE 2001 expected zero for 2010–2022; the outcome was −2.59M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
DANE estimates (model-based: there is no observed series)
Colombia: net migration — DANE projections vs DANE estimates
thousand persons a year
2 projections of DANE (the Colombian statistical office) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 2 of 2. The largest miss: DANE 2020 expected +911k for 2019–2024; the outcome was +1.68M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
Malaysia: non-citizens (migrants) — DOSM projections vs actual
thousand persons
2 projections of DOSM (the Malaysian statistical office) checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 1 of 2, above in 1. The largest miss: DOSM 2013 expected 2.54M for 2025; the outcome was 3.38M (+33.3%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Net migration of foreign nationals (Statistics Bureau of Japan, October–September years)
Japan: net migration of foreign nationals — IPSS projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
5 projections of IPSS (Japan's National Institute of Population and Social Security Research) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 5 of 5. The largest miss: IPSS 2017 expected +690k for 2016–2025; the outcome was +1.75M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
Net international migration (KOSTAT, calendar years; the projections use July–June years)
South Korea: net migration — KOSTAT projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
5 projections of Statistics Korea (KOSTAT) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 5 of 5. The largest miss: KOSTAT 2011 expected +533k for 2011–2025; the outcome was +1.21M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
CONAPO 2023 reconstruction (there is no direct count; reconstructions of different years differ a lot)
Mexico: net migration — CONAPO projections vs reconstruction
thousand persons a year
4 projections of CONAPO (Mexico's National Population Council) against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 3 of 4. The largest miss: CONAPO 2006 expected −7.67M for 2006–2019; the outcome was −2.15M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
Israel: migration balance — CBS projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
2 projections of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 2 of 2. The largest miss: CBS 2012 expected zero for 2010–2025; the outcome was +389k. The office will revise the latest facts again.
Non-Saudis, GASTAT series based on the 2022 census
Saudi Arabia: non-Saudi residents — development plans vs actual
thousand persons
2 projections of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Economy and Planning development plans checked against the facts at the latest common year: the outcome below the projection in 0 of 2, above in 2. The largest miss: MEP 2005 expected 4.05M for 2024; the outcome was 15.67M (+286.8%). The office will revise the latest facts again.
Net migration (Rosstat; from 2011 including registrations at the place of stay)
Russia: net migration — Rosstat projections vs actual
thousand persons a year
10 projections of Rosstat against the facts over the years each has covered (sums over those years): the outcome above the projection in 2 of 10. The largest miss: Rosstat 2009 expected +5.26M for 2010–2024; the outcome was +4M. The office will revise the latest facts again.
US: natural gas production — EIA projections vs actual
trillion cubic feet a year
Five-year-ahead projections of 15 AEO editions 2005–2019 under-projected gas production: the outcome was above the projection in 15 of 15 cases, median gap +18%. The largest miss: AEO2010 expected 19.3 trillion cubic feet a year for 2015, the outcome was 27.1.
US: crude oil production — EIA projections vs actual
million barrels per day
Five-year-ahead projections of 15 AEO editions 2005–2019 under-projected oil production: the outcome was above the projection in 12 of 15 cases, median gap +20%. The largest miss: AEO2010 expected 5.8 million barrels per day for 2015, the outcome was 9.4.
Five-year-ahead projections of 15 AEO editions 2005–2019 over-projected coal use: the outcome was below the projection in 15 of 15 cases, median gap −29%. The largest miss: AEO2015 expected 987 million short tons a year for 2020, the outcome was 477.
US: energy-related CO2 emissions — EIA projections vs actual
million tonnes of CO2 a year
Five-year-ahead projections of 15 AEO editions 2005–2019 over-projected CO2 emissions: the outcome was below the projection in 15 of 15 cases, median gap −8%. The largest miss: AEO2007 expected 6,369 million tonnes of CO2 a year for 2012, the outcome was 5,236.
Five-year-ahead projections of 15 AEO editions 2005–2019 under-projected wind generation: the outcome was above the projection in 12 of 15 cases, median gap +57%. The largest miss: AEO2005 expected 26 billion kWh a year for 2010, the outcome was 95.
Five-year-ahead projections of 10 AEO editions 2007–2016 under-projected solar generation: the outcome was above the projection in 10 of 10 cases, median gap +192%. The largest miss: AEO2008 expected 3.1 billion kWh a year for 2013, the outcome was 17.2.
Five-year-ahead projections of 15 AEO editions 2005–2019: the outcome above the projection 5 times, below 10; errors both ways. The largest miss: AEO2005 expected 29 US dollars per barrel (nominal) for 2010, the outcome was 76 (+164%).
World: solar capacity — US EIA projections vs actual
GW
4 releases: the outcome below the projection 0 times, above 4. Solar: photovoltaic and concentrating plants together; a scenario is not a forecast, yet it was used as one. International Energy Outlook reference case, each edition against the latest year with an outcome: Jul 2010: 56 GW expected for 2024, outcome 1,863 GW; Sep 2011: 95 GW expected for 2024, outcome 1,863 GW; Jul 2013: 178 GW expected for 2024, outcome 1,863 GW; May 2016: 350 GW expected for 2024, outcome 1,863 GW.
Next-year forecasts of 24 releases (2001–2024): the outcome above the forecast 13 times, below 11; typical error +1.42 $ a barrel. The largest under-forecast in July 2007: $66.92 expected for 2008, the outcome was $99.67. The largest over-forecast in July 2008: $132.75 expected for 2009, the outcome was $61.95. Forecast: the July issue of the US EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook for the next year, one forecast a year; outcome: EIA’s annual average price.
US gas (Henry Hub): US EIA next-year forecasts vs actual
$ per million Btu, annual average
Next-year forecasts of 14 releases (2010–2024): the outcome above the forecast 5 times, below 9; typical error −0.61 $ per million Btu. The largest under-forecast in July 2021: $3.00 expected for 2022, the outcome was $6.45. The largest over-forecast in July 2022: $4.76 expected for 2023, the outcome was $2.53. Forecast: the July issue of the US EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook for the next year, one forecast a year; outcome: EIA’s annual average price.
Economy: central banks, governments and professional forecasters
Dec 2015
Dec 2018
Dec 2019
Dec 2020
Dec 2021
Dec 2022
Actual (BEA, latest data)
US: inflation — Federal Reserve projections vs actual
% (PCE prices, Q4 over Q4)
Next-year projections of 69 releases (2007–2024): the outcome above the median projection 29 times, below 40; median error −0.11 pp. The largest under-projection in June 2020: 1.6% expected for 2021, the outcome was 5.7%. The largest over-projection in March 2014: 1.8% expected for 2015, the outcome was 0.2%. Medians before June 2015 are computed from participants' projections that the Fed publishes with a five-year lag. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
US: the federal funds rate — Fed projections vs actual
% at the end of the year (midpoint of the target range)
Next-year projections of 52 releases (2012–2024): the outcome above the median projection 27 times, below 25; median error +0.02 pp. The largest under-projection in March 2021: 0.1% expected for 2022, the outcome was 4.4%. The largest over-projection in March 2019: 2.6% expected for 2020, the outcome was 0.1%. Medians before June 2015 are computed from participants' projections that the Fed publishes with a five-year lag. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
US: unemployment — Federal Reserve projections vs actual
% (Q4 average)
Next-year projections of 69 releases (2007–2024): the outcome above the median projection 26 times, below 43; median error −0.23 pp. The largest under-projection in February 2008: 5.1% expected for 2009, the outcome was 9.9%. The largest over-projection in June 2020: 6.5% expected for 2021, the outcome was 4.2%. Medians before June 2015 are computed from participants' projections that the Fed publishes with a five-year lag. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
US: GDP growth — Federal Reserve projections vs actual
% (real GDP, Q4 over Q4)
Next-year projections of 69 releases (2007–2024): the outcome above the median projection 31 times, below 38; median error −0.22 pp. The largest under-projection in December 2022: 0.5% expected for 2023, the outcome was 3.4%. The largest over-projection in November 2007: 2.2% expected for 2008, the outcome was −2.5%. Medians before June 2015 are computed from participants' projections that the Fed publishes with a five-year lag. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 28 releases (2018–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 24 times, below 4; median error +1.15 pp. The largest under-forecast in March 2021: 3.0% expected for 2022, the outcome was 8.0%. The largest over-forecast in November 2018: 3.4% expected for 2019, the outcome was 2.9%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 64 releases (2017–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 54 times, below 10; median error +0.92 pp. The largest under-forecast in September 2020: 2.9% expected for 2021, the outcome was 10.1%. The largest over-forecast in May 2017: 4.6% expected for 2018, the outcome was 3.8%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 60 releases (2009–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 28 times, below 32; median error 0.00 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2020: 2.0% expected for 2021, the outcome was 6.0%. The largest over-forecast in January 2019: 2.1% expected for 2020, the outcome was −5.0%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 55 releases (2010–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 20 times, below 35; median error −0.10 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2021: 1.9% expected for 2022, the outcome was 6.7%. The largest over-forecast in January 2019: 2.0% expected for 2020, the outcome was 0.8%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 110 releases (1997–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 46 times, below 64; median error −0.28 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2020: 1.5% expected for 2021, the outcome was 9.2%. The largest over-forecast in May 2019: 1.9% expected for 2020, the outcome was −7.8%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 110 releases (1997–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 63 times, below 47; median error +0.23 pp. The largest under-forecast in May 2021: 2.0% expected for 2022, the outcome was 10.7%. The largest over-forecast in February 2014: 1.8% expected for 2015, the outcome was 0.1%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 62 releases (2001–2024) for the next fiscal year (April–March): the outcome above the forecast 16 times, below 46; median error −0.80 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2020: 1.1% expected for fiscal 2021/22, the outcome was 3.8%. The largest over-forecast in April 2007: 2.1% expected for fiscal 2008/09, the outcome was −3.3%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 62 releases (2001–2024) for the next fiscal year (April–March): the outcome above the forecast 23 times, below 39; median error −0.22 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2021: 0.7% expected for fiscal 2022/23, the outcome was 3.0%. The largest over-forecast in April 2008: 1.0% expected for fiscal 2009/10, the outcome was −1.6%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Russia: GDP growth — Bank of Russia forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 33 releases (2015–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 20 times, below 13; median error +1.05 pp. The largest under-forecast in July 2022: −2.5% expected for 2023, the outcome was 4.1%. The largest over-forecast in March 2019: 2.0% expected for 2020, the outcome was −2.7%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Russia: inflation — Bank of Russia forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 33 releases (2015–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 28 times, below 5; median error +1.42 pp. The largest under-forecast in February 2021: 4.0% expected for 2022, the outcome was 11.9%. The largest over-forecast in December 2016: 4.0% expected for 2017, the outcome was 2.5%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Russia: the policy rate — Bank of Russia forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 16 releases (2021–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 15 times, below 1; median error +4.15 pp. The largest under-forecast in February 2023: 7.0% expected for 2024, the outcome was 17.5%. The largest over-forecast in April 2022: 10.0% expected for 2023, the outcome was 9.9%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 44 releases (2014–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 43 times, below 1; median error +10.64 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2021: 7.0% expected for 2022, the outcome was 64.3%. The largest over-forecast in October 2018: 15.2% expected for 2019, the outcome was 11.8%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 83 releases (2004–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 39 times, below 44; median error 0.00 pp. The largest under-forecast in March 2020: 1.3% expected for 2021, the outcome was 6.4%. The largest over-forecast in March 2019: 1.6% expected for 2020, the outcome was −6.1%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 83 releases (2004–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 43 times, below 40; median error +0.10 pp. The largest under-forecast in March 2021: 1.2% expected for 2022, the outcome was 8.4%. The largest over-forecast in September 2008: 2.6% expected for 2009, the outcome was 0.3%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 67 releases (2008–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 11 times, below 56; median error −0.50 pp. The largest under-forecast in February 2020: 3.0% expected for 2021, the outcome was 4.9%. The largest over-forecast in August 2019: 2.8% expected for 2020, the outcome was −0.4%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 72 releases (2007–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 28 times, below 44; median error −0.33 pp. The largest under-forecast in February 2021: 1.5% expected for 2022, the outcome was 7.8%. The largest over-forecast in November 2008: 3.5% expected for 2009, the outcome was 2.1%. Where the bank published only a range, its midpoint is used. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 57 releases (2016–2025) for the fiscal year starting in April of the release year: the outcome above the forecast 32 times, below 25; median error +0.20 pp. The largest under-forecast in October 2020: −9.5% expected for fiscal 2020/21, the outcome was −5.8%. The largest over-forecast in February 2020: 6.0% expected for fiscal 2020/21, the outcome was −5.8%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 26 releases (2021–2025) for the fiscal year starting in April of the release year: the outcome above the forecast 13 times, below 13; median error +0.05 pp. The largest under-forecast in February 2022: 4.5% expected for fiscal 2022/23, the outcome was 6.7%. The largest over-forecast in February 2025: 4.2% expected for fiscal 2025/26, the outcome was 2.1%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
New Zealand: GDP growth — RBNZ forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 25 releases (2018–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 5 times, below 20; median error −0.90 pp. The largest under-forecast in November 2022: −0.4% expected for 2023, the outcome was 1.5%. The largest over-forecast in August 2023: 1.6% expected for 2024, the outcome was −1.6%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
Forecasts of 25 releases (2018–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 15 times, below 10; median error +0.90 pp. The largest under-forecast in August 2020: 0.3% expected for 2021, the outcome was 5.9%. The largest over-forecast in February 2019: 2.0% expected for 2020, the outcome was 1.4%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
New Zealand: the policy rate — RBNZ forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 21 releases (2018–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 6 times, below 15; median error −0.69 pp. The largest under-forecast in May 2021: 0.7% expected for 2022, the outcome was 3.8%. The largest over-forecast in May 2024: 5.1% expected for 2025, the outcome was 2.5%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
South Africa: GDP growth — SARB forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 49 releases (2015–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 11 times, below 38; median error −0.40 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2020: 1.6% expected for 2021, the outcome was 4.7%. The largest over-forecast in March 2019: 1.8% expected for 2020, the outcome was −6.0%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
South Africa: inflation — SARB forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 49 releases (2015–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 17 times, below 32; median error −0.60 pp. The largest under-forecast in July 2021: 4.2% expected for 2022, the outcome was 6.9%. The largest over-forecast in March 2019: 5.3% expected for 2020, the outcome was 3.3%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
South Africa: the policy rate — SARB forecasts vs actual
%
Forecasts of 35 releases (2017–2024) for the next year: the outcome above the forecast 16 times, below 19; median error −0.28 pp. The largest under-forecast in January 2022: 5.8% expected for 2023, the outcome was 8.2%. The largest over-forecast in March 2019: 6.9% expected for 2020, the outcome was 3.5%. Outcomes use the latest data; GDP and inflation get revised.
US: GDP growth — professional forecasters vs actual
% (growth of annual average real GDP)
Next-year forecasts of 35 releases (1990–2024): the outcome above the forecast 18 times, below 17; typical error +0.09 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in November 1998: 2.1% expected for 1999, the outcome was 4.8%. The largest over-forecast in November 2019: 1.8% expected for 2020, the outcome was −2.1%. Forecast: the median of the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters in the fourth quarter (November) for the next year; outcomes use the latest data, and GDP gets revised.
US: unemployment — professional forecasters vs actual
% (annual average)
Next-year forecasts of 35 releases (1990–2024): the outcome above the forecast 9 times, below 26; typical error −0.26 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in November 2019: 3.6% expected for 2020, the outcome was 8.1%. The largest over-forecast in November 2020: 6.3% expected for 2021, the outcome was 5.3%. Forecast: the median of the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters in the fourth quarter (November) for the next year; outcomes use the latest data, and GDP gets revised.
US: inflation — professional forecasters vs actual
% (CPI, Q4 over Q4)
Next-year forecasts of 35 releases (1990–2024): the outcome above the forecast 13 times, below 22; typical error −0.23 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in November 2020: 2.0% expected for 2021, the outcome was 6.8%. The largest over-forecast in November 1990: 5.2% expected for 1991, the outcome was 3.0%. Forecast: the median of the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters in the fourth quarter (November) for the next year; outcomes use the latest data, and GDP gets revised.
UK: GDP growth — HM Treasury and OBR forecasts vs actual
% (real GDP growth)
Next-year forecasts of 83 releases (1983–2024): the outcome above the forecast 34 times, below 49; typical error −0.10 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in March 2020: 1.8% expected for 2021, the outcome was 8.5%. The largest over-forecast in March 2019: 1.4% expected for 2020, the outcome was −10.0%. Forecasts to 2010 by HM Treasury, then by the independent OBR; the midpoint where a range was published.
Greece: GDP growth — European Commission forecasts vs actual
% (real GDP growth)
Next-year forecasts of 55 releases (2000–2024): the outcome above the forecast 21 times, below 34; typical error −0.39 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in November 2020: 5.0% expected for 2021, the outcome was 8.7%. The largest over-forecast in November 2019: 2.3% expected for 2020, the outcome was −9.2%. Spring and autumn European Commission editions (PDFs 2000–2010, AMECO from 2011).
Italy: GDP growth — European Commission forecasts vs actual
% (real GDP growth)
Next-year forecasts of 55 releases (2000–2024): the outcome above the forecast 15 times, below 40; typical error −0.50 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in November 2020: 4.1% expected for 2021, the outcome was 8.9%. The largest over-forecast in May 2019: 0.7% expected for 2020, the outcome was −8.9%. Spring and autumn European Commission editions (PDFs 2000–2010, AMECO from 2011).
18 releases: the outcome below the projection 16 times, above 2. A baseline assumes current law: laws passed later are part of the gap. CBO January baselines, each against the latest year with an outcome: Jan 2007: 1.2% of GDP expected for 2017, outcome −3.4% of GDP; Jan 2008: 1.0% of GDP expected for 2018, outcome −3.8% of GDP; Jan 2009: −1.1% of GDP expected for 2019, outcome −4.6% of GDP; Jan 2010: −3.0% of GDP expected for 2020, outcome −14.7% of GDP; Jan 2011: −3.2% of GDP expected for 2021, outcome −12.0% of GDP; Jan 2012: −1.4% of GDP expected for 2022, outcome −5.4% of GDP; Feb 2013: −3.8% of GDP expected for 2023, outcome −6.2% of GDP; Feb 2014: −4.0% of GDP expected for 2024, outcome −6.3% of GDP; Jan 2015: −4.0% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Jan 2016: −4.6% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Jan 2017: −4.5% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Apr 2018: −5.1% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Jan 2019: −4.5% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Jan 2020: −4.9% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Feb 2021: −4.0% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; May 2022: −4.7% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Feb 2023: −6.1% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP; Feb 2024: −6.1% of GDP expected for 2025, outcome −5.8% of GDP.
US: GDP growth — the President’s budget assumptions vs actual
% (growth of annual average real GDP)
Next-year forecasts of 29 releases (1992–2022): the outcome above the forecast 9 times, below 20; typical error −0.60 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in February 2020: 3.1% expected for 2021, the outcome was 6.3%. The largest over-forecast in February 2008: 3.0% expected for 2009, the outcome was −2.6%. Assumption: growth in the budget year of the budget submitted early in the previous year (GDP from the FY1993 budget). OMB writes that its forecasts run above the outcome partly because they assume the President’s proposals are enacted.
Next-year forecasts of 24 releases (1998–2024): the outcome above the forecast 6 times, below 18; typical error −0.90 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in December 2009: 1.4% expected for 2010, the outcome was 3.4%. The largest over-forecast in December 2007: 2.0% expected for 2008, the outcome was −3.3%. Forecast: the December cabinet understanding (閣議了解) on the next fiscal year; the January cabinet decision (閣議決定) gives the same figures. The year is the start of the fiscal year.
Actual (Bank of Russia, Ministry of Economic Development, IMF)
Russia: dollar rate — budget assumptions vs actual
₽ per $, annual average
Next-year forecasts of 17 releases (2008–2024): the outcome above the forecast 12 times, below 5; typical error +2.21 ₽. The largest under-forecast in July 2014: 37.0 ₽ expected for 2015, the outcome was 61.3 ₽. The largest over-forecast in September 2024: 96.5 ₽ expected for 2025, the outcome was 83.2 ₽. Budget assumptions: the base forecast of the Ministry of Finance’s budget policy guidelines (2009–2026), the 2009 budget law and the Ministry of Economic Development’s 2015 scenario.
Actual (Bank of Russia, Ministry of Economic Development, IMF)
Russia: Urals oil — budget assumptions vs actual
$ a barrel
Next-year forecasts of 15 releases (2008–2022): the outcome above the forecast 9 times, below 6; typical error +10.90 dollars a barrel. The largest under-forecast in August 2010: $75.0 expected for 2011, the outcome was $109.3. The largest over-forecast in July 2014: $100.0 expected for 2015, the outcome was $51.2. Budget assumptions: the base forecast of the Ministry of Finance’s budget policy guidelines (2009–2026), the 2009 budget law and the Ministry of Economic Development’s 2015 scenario.
Actual (Bank of Russia, Ministry of Economic Development, IMF)
Russia: GDP growth — budget assumptions vs actual
% on the previous year
Next-year forecasts of 17 releases (2008–2024): the outcome above the forecast 9 times, below 8; typical error +0.52 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in October 2022: −0.8% expected for 2023, the outcome was 4.1%. The largest over-forecast in November 2008: 6.7% expected for 2009, the outcome was −7.8%. Budget assumptions: the base forecast of the Ministry of Finance’s budget policy guidelines (2009–2026), the 2009 budget law and the Ministry of Economic Development’s 2015 scenario.
Actual (Bank of Russia, Ministry of Economic Development, IMF)
Russia: inflation — budget assumptions vs actual
% (December over December)
Next-year forecasts of 17 releases (2008–2024): the outcome above the forecast 12 times, below 5; typical error +0.97 percentage points. The largest under-forecast in December 2021: 4.0% expected for 2022, the outcome was 11.9%. The largest over-forecast in December 2016: 4.0% expected for 2017, the outcome was 2.5%. Budget assumptions: the base forecast of the Ministry of Finance’s budget policy guidelines (2009–2026), the 2009 budget law and the Ministry of Economic Development’s 2015 scenario.
World: steel demand — worldsteel next-year forecasts vs actual
% (annual growth of world steel use)
Next-year forecasts of 12 releases (2019–2024): the outcome came in below the forecast in all 12; typical error −3.05 percentage points. The largest over-forecast in April 2021: 2.7% expected for 2022, the outcome was −3.3%. Forecast and outcome: world apparent use of finished steel in the World Steel Association’s Short Range Outlook, releases 2019–2024; outcome: the year’s growth in the following year’s release. Source: World Steel Association.
Medium variant of the UN projection published in July 2024 versus births reported by national statistics.
In 33 of 42 countries with data for the latest year, reality is below the UN medium variant; in 8, below the lower 95% bound.
Country
Year
UN (medium)
Actual
Gap
Below 95% interval?
Colombia
2025
693k
442k
−36%
yes
Romania
2025*
179k
134k
−25%
yes
Tunisia
2024
164k
126k
−23%
yes
Lithuania
2025
22.1k
17.6k
−20%
yes
Poland
2025
297k
238k
−20%
yes
Argentina
2024
507k
413k
−18%
yes
Bulgaria
2025
60.4k
50.2k
−17%
yes
Kazakhstan
2025
395k
335k
−15%
no
Turkey
2025
1.05M
895k
−15%
no
Taiwan
2025
125k
108k
−14%
no
Hungary
2025*
84.3k
73.3k
−13%
yes
Belarus
2025
62.3k
54.3k
−13%
no
Czechia
2025*
86.9k
77.6k
−11%
no
Chile
2024*
172k
154k
−10%
no
Costa Rica
2025*
50.6k
45.4k
−10%
no
Uruguay
2024
33.2k
29.9k
−10%
no
China
2025
8.71M
7.92M
−9%
no
Germany
2025
708k
654k
−8%
no
Brazil
2024
2.57M
2.38M
−8%
no
Italy
2025*
383k
355k
−7%
no
European Union (27)
2025*
3.69M
3.46M
−6%
no
Puerto Rico
2025*
19.1k
18k
−6%
no
Malaysia
2024
440k
415k
−6%
no
Japan
2024
751k
709k
−6%
no
Australia
2025*
304k
290k
−5%
no
United Kingdom
2025
680k
650k
−4%
no
Switzerland
2025
81.8k
78.2k
−4%
no
Netherlands
2025
174k
167k
−4%
no
Greece
2025*
68.2k
65.4k
−4%
no
Russia
2024*
1.27M
1.22M
−4%
no
Spain
2025*
330k
321k
−3%
no
United States
2025*
3.66M
3.61M
−2%
no
New Zealand
2025*
58.5k
57.7k
−1%
no
Sweden
2025
97k
97.5k
+1%
no
Austria
2025
75.4k
76.1k
+1%
no
Portugal
2025
85.7k
87.8k
+2%
no
Canada
2025*
361k
373k
+3%
no
Ireland
2025*
52.6k
54.3k
+3%
no
South Korea
2025
246k
254k
+3%
no
Finland
2025
43.9k
45.8k
+4%
no
Norway
2025
53k
55.4k
+5%
no
Israel
2025
171k
182k
+6%
no
* provisional data. National statistics are compared with the UN only where, in years both exist, they matched the UN's estimates (within 5% two years running). Series with a different coverage or definition are excluded, e.g. France with its overseas departments, Hong Kong, Singapore, incomplete registration or registration year rather than year of birth. CSV
UN World Population Prospects: revisions and errors
For each revision: the latest period for which almost all countries already have actual data. The median is the typical error for one country; the shares show which way the errors went.
Indicator
Release
Period
Countries
Median, actual vs expected
Actual lower
Actual higher
Off by more than 10%
World
Population
UN 1998
2023
222
+2.9%
44%
56%
64%
+5.1%
Population
UN 2000
2023
223
+3.1%
43%
57%
61%
+3.8%
Population
UN 2002
2023
223
+5.3%
40%
61%
56%
+4.7%
Population
UN 2004
2023
223
+3.7%
39%
61%
50%
+4%
Population
UN 2006
2023
225
+2.9%
38%
62%
44%
+2.7%
Population
UN 2008
2023
226
+1.8%
43%
57%
41%
+2.7%
Population
UN 2010
2023
227
+1.3%
43%
57%
34%
+2.9%
Population
UN 2012
2023
232
+0.4%
47%
53%
30%
+1.9%
Population
UN 2015
2023
232
+0.7%
44%
56%
26%
+1.3%
Population
UN 2017
2023
232
+0.4%
47%
53%
20%
+0.7%
Population
UN 2019
2023
234
+0.7%
45%
55%
16%
+0.8%
Population
UN 2022
2023
237
+0.2%
47%
53%
8%
+0.6%
Births
UN 1998
2015–2020
180
+6.1%
38%
62%
69%
+9.1%
Births
UN 2000
2015–2020
183
+4.1%
43%
57%
68%
+3.8%
Births
UN 2002
2015–2020
188
+6.4%
39%
60%
69%
+4.4%
Births
UN 2004
2015–2020
188
+4.5%
42%
58%
69%
+3.5%
Births
UN 2006
2015–2020
192
+3.8%
43%
57%
66%
+2.9%
Births
UN 2008
2015–2020
193
+2.5%
45%
55%
61%
+3.6%
Births
UN 2010
2015–2020
194
+0.3%
49%
52%
60%
+4.4%
Births
UN 2012
2015–2020
200
−0.5%
51%
50%
49%
+1.7%
Births
UN 2015
2015–2020
200
−0.6%
51%
49%
39%
+0.5%
Births
UN 2017
2015–2020
200
−1%
56%
43%
36%
+0.4%
Births
UN 2019
2020–2025
33
−8.2%
88%
12%
46%
—
Births
UN 2022
2023
237
−1.9%
61%
38%
30%
−1.6%
Total fertility rate
UN 1998
2015–2020
180
+1.4%
48%
52%
63%
+7.4%
Total fertility rate
UN 2000
2015–2020
183
+0.3%
49%
51%
62%
+1.1%
Total fertility rate
UN 2002
2015–2020
188
+0.7%
47%
53%
61%
+2.1%
Total fertility rate
UN 2004
2015–2020
188
+0.6%
47%
53%
57%
+3.2%
Total fertility rate
UN 2006
2015–2020
192
+1.4%
45%
55%
57%
+3.7%
Total fertility rate
UN 2008
2015–2020
193
+2.4%
44%
56%
52%
+2.7%
Total fertility rate
UN 2010
2015–2020
194
+1.1%
47%
53%
52%
+3%
Total fertility rate
UN 2012
2015–2020
200
−2.1%
56%
44%
41%
+0.4%
Total fertility rate
UN 2015
2015–2020
200
−1.3%
54%
46%
36%
−0.5%
Total fertility rate
UN 2017
2015–2020
200
−1.8%
57%
43%
28%
−0.5%
Total fertility rate
UN 2019
2020–2025
28
−11.8%
93%
7%
71%
—
Total fertility rate
UN 2022
2023
237
−1.2%
60%
31%
26%
−2.6%
Deaths
UN 1998
2015–2020
180
−5%
64%
36%
58%
−3.4%
Deaths
UN 2000
2015–2020
183
−6.1%
68%
32%
55%
−6.1%
Deaths
UN 2002
2015–2020
188
−6.1%
69%
31%
55%
−13.2%
Deaths
UN 2004
2015–2020
188
−5.7%
70%
30%
50%
−10.5%
Deaths
UN 2006
2015–2020
192
−4%
67%
33%
46%
−7.9%
Deaths
UN 2008
2015–2020
193
−2.2%
60%
40%
47%
−6.2%
Deaths
UN 2010
2015–2020
194
−2.2%
57%
43%
43%
−4.7%
Deaths
UN 2012
2015–2020
200
−1.6%
56%
44%
45%
−4.1%
Deaths
UN 2015
2015–2020
200
+0.3%
48%
53%
38%
−1.4%
Deaths
UN 2017
2015–2020
200
+0.7%
46%
54%
34%
−0.5%
Deaths
UN 2022
2023
237
+0.1%
48%
51%
32%
+1.5%
Infant mortality
UN 1998
2015–2020
180
−31.5%
81%
19%
86%
−17.4%
Infant mortality
UN 2000
2015–2020
183
−27.4%
81%
19%
87%
−22.2%
Infant mortality
UN 2002
2015–2020
188
−28.3%
86%
14%
89%
−27.4%
Infant mortality
UN 2004
2015–2020
188
−26.4%
83%
17%
89%
−30.7%
Infant mortality
UN 2006
2015–2020
192
−25.5%
82%
18%
84%
−26.7%
Infant mortality
UN 2008
2015–2020
193
−21%
79%
21%
79%
−24.1%
Infant mortality
UN 2010
2015–2020
194
−18.7%
81%
19%
73%
−22.4%
Infant mortality
UN 2012
2015–2020
200
−6.2%
58%
42%
72%
−8.9%
Infant mortality
UN 2015
2015–2020
200
−4.3%
56%
44%
70%
−5.1%
Infant mortality
UN 2017
2015–2020
200
−1%
53%
48%
59%
−2%
Infant mortality
UN 2022
2023
237
+2.8%
41%
59%
48%
+2%
By country: Actual vs expected for several UN revisions; minus means the outcome was below the projection. Each revision uses the same period as in the summary above.
Here the error is the difference "actual minus projected" in the indicator's unit: percentages make no sense for migration, which changes sign. Migration is compared per 1,000 people so that countries of any size are comparable. The UN's facts end in 2023, so a five-year period that is not over is compared with the years so far (if they cover at least 60% of it).
Indicator
Release
Period
Countries
Median difference
Actual higher
Actual lower
World
Net migration rate
UN 1998
2020–2025*
180
+0.08 per 1,000
52%
47%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2000
2020–2025*
183
+0.22 per 1,000
55%
44%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2002
2020–2025*
188
+0.25 per 1,000
55%
45%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2004
2020–2025*
188
+0.41 per 1,000
60%
40%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2006
2020–2025*
192
+0.41 per 1,000
59%
41%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2008
2020–2025*
193
+0.5 per 1,000
61%
39%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2010
2020–2025*
194
+0.33 per 1,000
63%
37%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2012
2020–2025*
200
+0.39 per 1,000
62%
39%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2015
2020–2025*
200
+0.39 per 1,000
63%
37%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2017
2020–2025*
200
+0.35 per 1,000
63%
37%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2019
2020–2025*
200
+0.25 per 1,000
62%
37%
—
Net migration rate
UN 2022
2023
237
0 per 1,000
54%
42%
—
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 1998
2020–2025*
180
+0.5 yrs
61%
39%
+0.6 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2000
2020–2025*
183
+0.7 yrs
65%
36%
+1.4 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2002
2020–2025*
188
+0.9 yrs
66%
34%
+3.5 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2004
2020–2025*
188
+0.4 yrs
58%
42%
+2.6 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2006
2020–2025*
192
−0.1 yrs
49%
51%
+1.7 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2008
2020–2025*
193
−0.1 yrs
46%
54%
+1.5 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2010
2020–2025*
194
−0.2 yrs
43%
57%
+1.1 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2012
2020–2025*
200
−0.5 yrs
41%
59%
+0.7 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2015
2020–2025*
200
−0.7 yrs
33%
67%
0 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2017
2020–2025*
200
−0.7 yrs
27%
74%
−0.4 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2019
2020–2025*
200
−0.7 yrs
27%
74%
−0.7 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, women
UN 2022
2023
237
0 yrs
52%
48%
−0.1 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 1998
2020–2025*
180
+0.2 yrs
52%
48%
0 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2000
2020–2025*
183
+0.5 yrs
57%
43%
+0.5 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2002
2020–2025*
188
+0.7 yrs
60%
40%
+2.7 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2004
2020–2025*
188
+0.5 yrs
59%
42%
+1.8 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2006
2020–2025*
192
+0.1 yrs
53%
47%
+1 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2008
2020–2025*
193
−0.2 yrs
47%
53%
+0.6 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2010
2020–2025*
194
−0.1 yrs
45%
55%
+0.4 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2012
2020–2025*
200
−0.7 yrs
37%
63%
−0.2 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2015
2020–2025*
200
−1.1 yrs
27%
73%
−1 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2017
2020–2025*
200
−1.2 yrs
23%
78%
−1.1 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2019
2020–2025*
200
−1.2 yrs
18%
83%
−1.3 yrs
Life expectancy at birth, men
UN 2022
2023
237
0 yrs
52%
49%
−0.3 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 1998
2020–2025*
180
+2 yrs
85%
15%
+1.6 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2000
2020–2025*
183
+1.3 yrs
81%
19%
+1.1 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2002
2020–2025*
188
+1.1 yrs
86%
14%
+1.1 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2004
2020–2025*
188
+0.9 yrs
82%
18%
+0.6 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2006
2020–2025*
192
+0.8 yrs
78%
22%
0 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2008
2020–2025*
193
+0.6 yrs
73%
28%
+0.6 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2010
2020–2025*
194
+0.4 yrs
68%
32%
+0.6 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2012
2020–2025*
200
+0.2 yrs
62%
39%
+0.1 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2015
2020–2025*
200
0 yrs
50%
51%
+0.4 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2017
2020–2025*
200
0 yrs
49%
51%
+0.1 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2019
2020–2025*
200
0 yrs
50%
50%
0 yrs
Mean age of mothers at childbirth
UN 2022
2023
237
0 yrs
54%
45%
−0.1 yrs
* The five-year period is not over: the projection is compared with the mean of its years so far (UN facts end in 2023).
Why the UN's population projections missed
The projection of every UN revision for 2023 is set against the UN's 2024 estimate, and the gap is split along the population balance: the population at the start of the projection (which the UN later estimated anew), and births, deaths and net migration (arrivals minus departures) over the projected years (assumed against the current estimate). The "actual" is a UN estimate too: in countries without full registration of births and deaths it is a model, so the split shows how the UN's own picture changed.
Release
Start
Countries
Median absolute error
Starting population
Births
Deaths
Migration
World
UN 1998
1995
155
12.9%
12%
37%
16%
35%
+5.1%
UN 2000
2000
156
11.5%
15%
36%
16%
33%
+3.8%
UN 2002
2000
156
11%
13%
36%
19%
32%
+4.7%
UN 2004
2005
156
9.1%
19%
34%
17%
30%
+4%
UN 2006
2005
157
7.9%
19%
34%
15%
32%
+2.7%
UN 2008
2010
157
6.9%
29%
29%
12%
29%
+2.7%
UN 2010
2010
158
5.7%
27%
31%
12%
30%
+2.9%
UN 2012
2010
160
3.6%
28%
28%
13%
31%
+1.9%
UN 2015
2015
160
3.6%
38%
24%
9%
29%
+1.3%
UN 2017
2015
160
3.1%
36%
24%
9%
31%
+0.7%
UN 2019
2020
160
2.5%
58%
13%
8%
21%
+0.8%
UN 2022
2021
161
1.6%
57%
11%
9%
23%
+0.6%
Share of each part in the error, averaged over countries above one million people; the remainder (rounding and the revisions' five-year periods) is a few tenths of a percent of the population at most.
By country: the UN 2000 revision, what each part adds to "2024 estimate minus projection" (plus: more people than expected)
Do births rise after a war? Every war on a country's territory since 1955 (UCDP/PRIO: 1,000 or more battle deaths in a year, at least 500 of them on the country's own territory) is set against the country's own pre-war trend and against ten peace-time countries whose fertility was close the year before the war; the big wars before 1946 (dates from Encyclopaedia Britannica) against the countries not at war in those years, with births from the Human Mortality Database. Below: medians over all wars, the world wars, monthly births after a war began, regions of one country, and how UN projections missed in countries at war. Moving together in time is not proof of a cause; where registration is incomplete, the UN's "actual" is a model estimate.
Wars on countries' territory since 1955, against peace-time countries with the same fertility
What
When
Wars
Median gap
Middle half
Above the comparison
Sign test, p
Births
during the war
125
−0.6%
−3.7% … +1.9%
42%
0.07
Births
1–5 years after
101
−1.6%
−7.7% … +3.1%
42%
0.11
Births
6–10 years after
96
−2.7%
−11.9% … +8.6%
43%
0.18
Fertility, children per woman
during the war
125
0
−0.12 … +0.12
48%
0.72
Fertility, children per woman
1–5 years after
101
−0.04
−0.19 … +0.24
47%
0.55
Fertility, children per woman
6–10 years after
96
+0.03
−0.4 … +0.41
52%
0.76
Births per 1,000 people
during the war
125
0
−0.9 … +0.8
50%
0.93
Births per 1,000 people
1–5 years after
101
−0.3
−1.5 … +1.6
46%
0.43
Births per 1,000 people
6–10 years after
96
+0.1
−3 … +2.7
51%
0.92
Wars before 1950, against neutral countries (HMD)
What
When
Wars
Median gap
Middle half
Above the comparison
Sign test, p
Births
during the war
25
−8.6%
−15% … −1%
24%
0.01
Births
1–5 years after
25
−2.1%
−4.2% … +13.8%
40%
0.42
Births
6–10 years after
25
+7.5%
−6.5% … +22.3%
56%
0.69
Fertility, children per woman
during the war
4
−0.19
−0.28 … +0.04
25%
0.63
Fertility, children per woman
1–5 years after
4
−0.03
−0.17 … +0.64
50%
1.00
Fertility, children per woman
6–10 years after
4
+0.2
−0.2 … +1.34
50%
1.00
Births per 1,000 people
during the war
17
−1.4
−3.4 … −0.6
12%
0.00
Births per 1,000 people
1–5 years after
18
+0.6
−1.2 … +3.7
61%
0.48
Births per 1,000 people
6–10 years after
18
+2.5
−2.8 … +4.1
67%
0.24
The gap is the mean over the window of the country's deviation from its pre-war trend minus the same for the comparison countries (their median, year by year); births in percent, fertility in children per woman. p above 0.05: rises and falls are about as frequent.
World War I (1914–1918)
Country
Births before the war, thousands a year (1911–1913)
Lowest index (year)
Mean over 15 years after
Highest over 15 years after
Australia
fought
130.3
94 (1919)
99
106
Austria
fought
167.6
55 (1917)
75
90
Belgium
fought
172.7
49 (1918)
87
96
France
fought
751
42 (1916)
98
112
United Kingdom
fought
1,000.3
76 (1918)
83
109
Italy
fought
1,116.7
57 (1918)
96
105
Portugal
fought
210.6
79 (1919)
96
102
Switzerland
neutral
91.1
79 (1917)
80
89
Chile
neutral
136.5
100 (1914)
115
132
Denmark
neutral
73.7
93 (1919)
95
107
Spain
neutral
628.1
93 (1919)
104
108
Iceland
neutral
2.2
105 (1914)
118
127
Netherlands
neutral
170.1
98 (1919)
106
115
Norway
neutral
61.5
96 (1915)
88
113
Sweden
neutral
132
87 (1919)
80
105
World War II (1939–1945)
Country
Births before the war, thousands a year (1936–1938)
Lowest index (year)
Mean over 15 years after
Highest over 15 years after
Australia
fought
118.5
104 (1939)
170
194
Austria
fought
89.5
113 (1945)
127
144
Belgium
fought
130
77 (1941)
115
122
Canada
fought
223.4
103 (1939)
185
215
Denmark
fought
67.4
101 (1939)
118
143
Finland
fought
72.6
85 (1942)
129
149
France
fought
623.8
79 (1941)
133
140
United Kingdom
fought
726.5
96 (1941)
118
141
Italy
fought
997.2
82 (1944)
91
104
Japan
fought
2,127.9
91 (1939)
95
128
Netherlands
fought
173.4
104 (1939)
138
164
Norway
fought
43.8
105 (1941)
146
162
United States
fought
2,421.7
102 (1939)
164
178
Switzerland
neutral
63.7
100 (1939)
137
148
Chile
neutral
155.1
106 (1939)
138
168
Portugal
neutral
201.1
92 (1941)
104
110
Sweden
neutral
91.1
105 (1940)
124
146
Monthly births after a war began
Births in months 9–14 after the war began (the first half-year of children conceived during it) against the same months a year earlier; next to it, the same change a year earlier and the median of countries without war with monthly data over the same months.
Country
Start
Change after
A year earlier
Countries without war (how many)
Russia invasion of Ukraine
02.2022
−4%
−4.5%
−4.7% (91)
Russia mobilisation
09.2022
−3.1%
−7.3%
−4.6% (91)
Israel 7 October and the Gaza war
10.2023
+2.7%
−1.8%
−3% (80)
Israel Gaza war
07.2014
+1.1%
+4%
−1% (86)
Israel Lebanon war
07.2006
+2.5%
+2.9%
+1.5% (86)
Lebanon war with Israel
07.2006
+13.8%
−5.4%
+1.5% (86)
Armenia Second Karabakh war
09.2020
−5.2%
+2.6%
+0.4% (97)
Azerbaijan Second Karabakh war
09.2020
−21.1%
−5.1%
+0.3% (98)
Georgia war with Russia
08.2008
+12.5%
+13.8%
+0.6% (73)
Croatia war in Croatia
08.1991
−11.5%
−7.3%
−1.1% (59)
Cyprus Turkish invasion
07.1974
−9.4%
−5.5%
−2.1% (56)
United States Iraq war
03.2003
+1.2%
+1.5%
+0.6% (68)
United Kingdom Falklands war
04.1982
+0.9%
−2.3%
+0.1% (63)
Tajikistan civil war
05.1992
−9.1%
−4.1%
−2.3% (61)
Kyrgyzstan border war with Tajikistan
09.2022
+0.4%
+0.9%
−4.6% (91)
Ukraine: birth registrations
Ukraine's Ministry of Justice publishes only half-year and annual totals, no monthly series. Registrations include stillbirths, cover only the government-controlled territory and leave out children born abroad. Pre-war pace: −7.3% a year (2016–2021).
Year
Births registered
At the pre-war pace
2016
399,281
—
2017
366,123
—
2018
337,825
—
2019
310,605
—
2020
295,293
—
2021
273,772
—
2022
206,032
253,870
2023
187,387
235,414
2024
176,679
218,301
2025
168,778
202,431
Regions of one country
Births per 1,000 people: the quarter of regions with the most violence per person against the rest (regions under 1% of the population are left out). Ukraine is not compared: after 2014 its statistics count births in Donetsk and Luhansk only in the government-controlled part, while the population stays whole-oblast.
Country
Regions with the most violence
Measure
Births per 1,000: these regions / the rest
Colombia
Meta, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Cauca, Magdalena
deaths (UCDP), 1998–2005
19.2 / 18.8 (1998)
14.3 / 14.9 (2010)
12.3 / 12.1 (2020)
Mexico
Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Guerrero, Baja California, Sonora, Nuevo León
homicides (INEGI), 2007–2011
21.6 / 21.8 (2007)
17.5 / 17.7 (2016)
14.4 / 14.4 (2020)
UN projections in countries at war
Errors of UN revisions 1998–2022 8–15 years ahead (actual against projected, percent) by whether a war took place on the country's territory during the projected years; also by fertility in the year of the revision, since high fertility goes with larger errors by itself.
Indicator
During the projection
Fertility
Checks
Median |error|
Median error
Actual above
Births
no conflict
all
1166
14.6%
+3.5%
57%
Births
no conflict
4+ children
223
20.3%
+13.3%
71%
Births
no conflict
below 2.5
651
12.9%
−0.6%
48%
Births
no conflict
2.5–4
292
19.2%
+7.1%
65%
Births
minor conflicts
all
281
16.5%
+4.7%
58%
Births
minor conflicts
4+ children
116
15.3%
+6.5%
66%
Births
minor conflicts
below 2.5
92
16.7%
−1.3%
46%
Births
minor conflicts
2.5–4
73
17.1%
+11%
63%
Births
war
all
143
18.1%
+6.2%
62%
Births
war
4+ children
88
15.8%
+7.3%
61%
Births
war
below 2.5
26
19.2%
+10.3%
73%
Births
war
2.5–4
29
24.3%
+0.6%
55%
Population
no conflict
all
10022
6.7%
+1.2%
56%
Population
no conflict
4+ children
1590
8.6%
+5.2%
68%
Population
no conflict
below 2.5
5933
5.6%
+0.4%
53%
Population
no conflict
2.5–4
2499
8.4%
+1.2%
56%
Population
minor conflicts
all
2102
5.7%
+3.6%
69%
Population
minor conflicts
4+ children
914
7.5%
+5.7%
74%
Population
minor conflicts
below 2.5
648
3.7%
+2%
64%
Population
minor conflicts
2.5–4
540
7.3%
+2.8%
66%
Population
war
all
1134
8.5%
+3.9%
62%
Population
war
4+ children
677
9.8%
+5.8%
66%
Population
war
below 2.5
204
4.7%
+3.5%
71%
Population
war
2.5–4
253
7.9%
−3.6%
44%
Total fertility rate
no conflict
all
1154
12.4%
+0.4%
51%
Total fertility rate
no conflict
4+ children
223
18.1%
+11.7%
66%
Total fertility rate
no conflict
below 2.5
639
10.9%
−2.6%
43%
Total fertility rate
no conflict
2.5–4
292
11.4%
+2.1%
57%
Total fertility rate
minor conflicts
all
278
14.1%
+4.5%
63%
Total fertility rate
minor conflicts
4+ children
116
14.6%
+6.4%
71%
Total fertility rate
minor conflicts
below 2.5
92
12.7%
−2.1%
49%
Total fertility rate
minor conflicts
2.5–4
70
16.8%
+8.6%
69%
Total fertility rate
war
all
143
14.1%
+6.8%
64%
Total fertility rate
war
4+ children
88
12.6%
+6.2%
65%
Total fertility rate
war
below 2.5
26
14.5%
+9.1%
65%
Total fertility rate
war
2.5–4
29
17.4%
+11.6%
62%
The largest part of the error of the population projection for 2023 (share of projections):
Long-term EU population projections (EUROPOP 2013, 2015, 2019, 2023) and short-term updates against Eurostat's own statistics. Eurostat has withdrawn the 2013 and 2015 editions; their files come from copies in the Internet Archive.
Fertility for 2024: what each edition assumed and what happened
Actual: immigrants minus emigrants by registration data (migr_imm8 − migr_emi2) where available; otherwise Eurostat's net migration with adjustments (demo_gind), which also carries post-census corrections. For Poland in 2022 the projection counted refugees from Ukraine, whom the official population barely includes.
IMF World Economic Outlook: next-year forecasts
Error = actual minus forecast, in percentage points; actual values from the latest IMF edition. The large errors of 2009 and 2020 are crises the forecasts did not expect.
Edition
Year
Real GDP growth
Inflation
Government budget balance
Countries
Median error
Actual below forecast
Countries
Median error
Actual below forecast
Countries
Median error
Actual below forecast
IMF Apr 2007
2008
179
−1 pp
65%
177
+4.1 pp
4%
—
—
—
IMF Oct 2007
2008
179
−1 pp
66%
177
+3.6 pp
4%
—
—
—
IMF Apr 2008
2009
180
−4.4 pp
87%
178
−1.2 pp
66%
—
—
—
IMF Oct 2008
2009
179
−4 pp
89%
178
−2.7 pp
78%
—
—
—
IMF Apr 2009
2010
180
+2 pp
23%
179
0 pp
50%
—
—
—
IMF Oct 2009
2010
181
+1.6 pp
22%
180
+0.2 pp
46%
—
—
—
IMF Apr 2010
2011
181
0 pp
51%
180
+1.2 pp
27%
33
+0.7 pp
39%
IMF Oct 2010
2011
181
−0.1 pp
51%
180
+1 pp
27%
180
+0.9 pp
32%
IMF Apr 2011
2012
181
−0.9 pp
64%
180
0 pp
50%
179
−0.1 pp
53%
IMF 09 2011
2012
181
−0.7 pp
62%
180
−0.1 pp
52%
180
0 pp
51%
IMF Apr 2012
2013
182
−0.6 pp
63%
181
−0.8 pp
66%
179
−0.3 pp
56%
IMF Oct 2012
2013
184
−0.4 pp
58%
183
−0.8 pp
68%
184
0 pp
51%
IMF Apr 2013
2014
185
−0.4 pp
58%
183
−1.1 pp
73%
185
−0.2 pp
53%
IMF Oct 2013
2014
187
−0.2 pp
54%
185
−1 pp
73%
187
+0.3 pp
43%
IMF Apr 2014
2015
187
−0.6 pp
65%
186
−1.4 pp
75%
186
−0.2 pp
53%
IMF Oct 2014
2015
188
−0.5 pp
62%
187
−1.5 pp
75%
187
0 pp
49%
IMF Apr 2015
2016
188
−0.3 pp
58%
187
−1 pp
72%
187
+0.2 pp
47%
IMF Oct 2015
2016
188
−0.1 pp
53%
187
−0.9 pp
71%
187
+0.5 pp
39%
IMF Apr 2016
2017
190
0 pp
48%
190
−0.1 pp
57%
188
+0.7 pp
35%
IMF Oct 2016
2017
190
+0.1 pp
47%
190
−0.1 pp
53%
189
+0.9 pp
32%
IMF Apr 2017
2018
191
0 pp
47%
191
−0.3 pp
59%
190
+0.9 pp
34%
IMF Oct 2017
2018
192
0 pp
48%
190
−0.3 pp
57%
190
+0.8 pp
30%
IMF Apr 2018
2019
191
−0.4 pp
63%
191
−0.6 pp
69%
190
+0.2 pp
45%
IMF Oct 2018
2019
192
−0.3 pp
62%
192
−0.7 pp
75%
191
+0.2 pp
45%
IMF Apr 2019
2020
188
−6.9 pp
97%
190
−1.2 pp
71%
189
−4.2 pp
83%
IMF Oct 2019
2020
188
−7 pp
97%
191
−1 pp
72%
189
−4.1 pp
79%
IMF Apr 2020
2021
186
+0.9 pp
40%
188
+1 pp
30%
187
0 pp
49%
IMF Oct 2020
2021
187
+1.8 pp
31%
190
+1.1 pp
27%
188
+1.1 pp
38%
IMF Apr 2021
2022
186
+0.1 pp
45%
189
+5 pp
6%
187
+0.9 pp
38%
IMF Oct 2021
2022
185
0 pp
49%
188
+4.4 pp
7%
186
+1.1 pp
35%
IMF Apr 2022
2023
182
−0.6 pp
62%
190
+1.6 pp
25%
185
−0.1 pp
51%
IMF Oct 2022
2023
183
0 pp
49%
191
+0.5 pp
43%
185
0 pp
50%
IMF Apr 2023
2024
167
−0.1 pp
53%
184
−0.5 pp
66%
170
0 pp
50%
IMF Oct 2023
2024
167
+0.1 pp
49%
184
−0.7 pp
71%
173
+0.1 pp
48%
IMF Apr 2024
2025
74
−0.1 pp
51%
142
−0.4 pp
55%
62
−0.1 pp
52%
IMF Oct 2024
2025
74
−0.1 pp
53%
142
−0.4 pp
58%
63
0 pp
49%
Context
Pension-system assumptions
What fertility official pension and budget calculations assume, and what it actually is.
Intermediate ultimate TFR 1.9 (unchanged from 2024 report) but now reached in 2050, 10 years later than in the 2024 report; low-cost 2.1, high-cost 1.6.
1.5995 in 2024 (1,599.5 births per 1,000 women; record low; 2023: 1.621) — CDC/NCHS final 2024 data (NVSR vol. 75 no. 2, 9 June 2026). Provisional 2025: 3,606,400 births (-1%), general fertility rate 53.1 (TFR not given in the provisional report).
IPSS 'Population Projections for Japan (2023 Estimates)': medium-fertility TFR 1.36 in 2070 (high 1.64, low 1.13); base 1.33 (2020 actual); net migration of foreigners 164,000/yr (variants 250,000 and 69,000).
1.15 in 2024 (record low); 1.14 in 2025 (preliminary; births 671,236 vs 686,173 in 2024; natural decrease 918,253).
Statistics Korea 2021 population projection, medium: TFR 0.73 (2023) falling to 0.70 (2024) then recovering to 0.96 (2030), 1.19 (2040) and 1.21 from 2046. (4th projection, 2018: 1.27 in 2023 rising to 1.38.)
0.72 (2023), 0.75 (2024), 0.80 (2025; births 254.3 thousand, +6.7%) — Statistics Korea 'Birth Statistics in 2025', 26 Aug 2026.
RVB 2025: TFR held constant at 1.45 in the long run, with a gradual rise until 2035 (the 15th coordinated population projection had assumed 1.55 long-term); net migration 250,000 a year. Destatis 16th projection: G1 low ~1.30 (1.29 by 2070), G2 moderate 1.45 by end-2030s then 1.47, G3 high 1.55 by 2030 then 1.65 (all assume a slight fall in 2025).
OBR long-term projections are underpinned by the ONS 2021-based population projections (long-term TFR 1.59 by mid-2045). The ONS 2022-based projections (28 Jan 2025) lowered the long-term TFR to 1.45 by 2047 (net migration 340,000/yr). The OBR 2025 report notes the latest ONS projections imply faster ageing 'due to birth rates falling even further below replacement than previously forecast'.
Ultimate TFR 1.35 from 2033 (rising from 1.26 in 2023, partly attributed to the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care plan), down from 1.54 in the 31st report (as at 31 Dec 2021); sensitivity tests 1.05 (higher cost) and 1.65 (lower cost).
Statistics Canada table 13-10-0418-01: 1.27 (2023), 1.26 (2024), 1.26 (2025). (The CPP report cites 1.26 for 2023.)
June 2025 report: TFR 1.8 and net migration +70,000/yr (INSEE 2021 projections). June 2026 report: TFR 1.45 from 2028 and net migration +150,000/yr from 2026 (new INSEE assumptions published April 2026); variants 1.2 and 1.7.
1.61 (2024), 1.56 (2025, provisional; lowest since the end of WWI) — INSEE Bilan démographique 2025 (13 Jan 2026).
China
About 1.0: UN WPP 2024 estimates 1.00 (2023) and 1.01 (2024). NBS (via search-result excerpt of Caixin Global, 19 Jan 2026): 7.92 million births in 2025 (9.54 million in 2024), population -3.39 million.
Pro-natal policies and results
Money and programmes against the fertility path. Rises happen, but no country has returned to 2.1 for good.
Country
TFR path
South Korea
National low-fertility measures since 2006 (programme details not verified here); 2025 pension reform extended the pension 'childbirth credit' to the first child (12 months) and removed the 50-month cap (MOHW, 20 Mar 2025).
Expanded family support since 2010, including sizeable family tax breaks (OECD: tax breaks for families exceed 0.5% of GDP in France, Germany and Hungary).
Family 500+ universal child-raising benefit (from 2016, per task brief), raised to PLN 800 per month per child under 18 regardless of income from 1 January 2024 ('Rodzina 800 plus').
Maternity (family) capital from 1 January 2007 (Federal Law No. 256-FZ of 29.12.2006); initial amount 250,000 rubles; available for first births from 2020; programme extended to 2030; from 1 Feb 2024 639,400 rubles (first child) and 883,000 rubles (second child).
Children's Future Strategy 'Acceleration Plan' adopted December 2023: about JPY 3.6 trillion-scale expansion of child-rearing support (child allowance expansion, universal day-care access, pregnancy benefit, post-birth leave benefits, pension-contribution exemption), partly financed by a new 'child and child-rearing support levy' on all generations and firms.
Where official demographic statistics have become closed or incomplete.
Russia: Monthly demographic statistics withdrawn: Rosstat's monthly report 'Socio-economic situation of Russia' for January–May 2025 appeared without its 'Demographics' section (no population size, natural increase, births, deaths, marriages, divorces or migration); Rosstat also skipped its monthly 'natural population movement' summary for April 2025. The preceding monthly reports had already carried only national aggregates without regional breakdowns (regional operational data on births, deaths, marriages and divorces disappeared first). (Regional monthly breakdowns dropped in spring 2025 (last broadly available update March 2025); whole demographic section absent from the January–May 2025 report published in early July 2025.) ru.themoscowtimes.com
Russia: Detailed final mortality data for 2024 (deaths by sex, age and cause) not released; when researcher Dmitry Kobak requested it in June 2025, Rosstat replied that the government had 'принял решение о временном приостановлении' (decided on a temporary suspension) of access to these previously open data. (June 2025 (detailed cause-of-death tables normally due end of June were not published).) zona.media
Russia: Regional life-expectancy estimates for 2024 (due on Rosstat's site by 20 March 2025) not published; only the national figure was released. (March 2025) zona.media
Russia: Tables with detailed data on deaths and mortality from external causes (by age group) removed from Rosstat's natural-population-movement dataset. (July 2024) istories.media
Belarus: Belstat stopped publishing new mortality data from June 2020; in May 2021 it postponed indefinitely the release of 2020 mortality and migration data (normally published in a natural-movement bulletin); births and deaths data have not been published since 2020. (From June 2020; 2020 mortality/migration release (scheduled 17 May 2021) postponed the day before.) euroradio.fm
Ukraine: State Statistics Service (Derzhstat) has not disclosed official demographic statistics (births, deaths, population) for the war period; its SDG metadata for 2022–2023 states disclosure 'will be resumed after the completion of the deadline for submission of statistical and financial reports' set by the martial-law reporting law. A population estimate was prepared but its publication (format, scope, timing) was still being discussed with the government in 2026. Registered births/deaths are reported by the Ministry of Justice (2024: ~176,600 births, ~495,000 deaths, government-controlled territory). (From 2022 onward) sdg.stat.gov.ua
China: National cremation figures for Q4 2022 omitted from the Ministry of Civil Affairs' quarterly civil-affairs statistics released 9 June 2023 (cremation numbers had been released regularly in the Q4 report since 2007); Zhejiang's provincial Q1-2023 cremation figures (~170,000, about +73% y/y) were posted and later deleted. Per SCMP (search-result excerpt), Chongqing's civil-affairs bureau announced on 9 June 2023 an indefinite suspension of civil-affairs data releases following a Ministry instruction. (June 2023) taiwannews.com.tw
China: A key fertility-rate data series was dropped from the latest China Statistical Yearbook (as reported 27 Oct 2017 by SCMP). (2017) chinafile.com
Turkey: TurkStat (TÜİK) postponed 'Death and Cause of Death Statistics, 2020' (due June 2021) and the 2021 edition (due 23 June 2022, postponed the day before) plus 'Life Tables, 2019–2021'; it also postponed 'International Migration Statistics, 2020' (due 16 July 2021). The 2020 and 2021 death statistics were eventually published in February 2023 (2020 deaths: 507,938, +16.5% y/y). (June 2021 – February 2023) evrensel.net
India: Decennial census due in 2021 postponed (house-listing planned April–September 2020, population enumeration 9–28 February 2021); a new census was notified on 16 June 2025 with reference date 1 March 2027 (1 October 2026 for snow-bound areas). Vital-statistics reports were also delayed: the Civil Registration System and MCCD reports for 2021 were published on 6 May 2025 and the SRS Statistical Report 2021 on 7 May 2025 (2022 editions in June 2025). (Census: postponed from 2020/21 to 2026/27. Vital statistics for 2021: released May 2025.) morungexpress.com
Venezuela: Health Ministry stopped releasing epidemiological figures (incl. infant and maternal mortality) after July 2015; bulletins reappeared on the ministry website in May 2017 after nearly two years of silence. (July 2015 – May 2017) voanews.com
UN "Replacement Migration" (2000)
Migrants needed over 1995–2050 according to the UN calculation of 2000. un.org
Area
Keep population
Keep 15–64
Keep worker-to-retiree ratio
France
1.47M
5.46M
93.8M
Germany
17.8M
25.2M
188M
Italy
12.9M
19.6M
120M
Japan
17.1M
33.5M
553M
Republic of Korea
1.51M
6.43M
5.15B
Russian Federation
28M
35.8M
257M
United Kingdom
2.63M
6.25M
59.8M
United States
6.38M
18M
593M
Europe
100M
161M
1.39B
European Union
47.5M
79.6M
701M
Fertility in origin countries
The countries that send the most migrants are themselves near or below replacement.
Country
Children per woman
Year
India
1.90
2024
Mexico
1.60
2023
Philippines
1.90
2022
Turkey
1.42
2025
Morocco
1.97
2024
Colombia
1.00
2025
Vietnam
1.93
2025
Egypt
2.75
2023 UN
Nigeria
4.80
2024
Pakistan
3.61
2023 UN
Bangladesh
2.30
2022
Kazakhstan
2.57
2025
Uzbekistan
3.50
2023 UN
Ukraine
0.98
2023 UN
China
1.00
2023 UN
What these data do not show
World population is still growing and, depending on the source, will peak between the middle and the end of the century. Specific countries and regions are shrinking fast: East Asia, Southern and Eastern Europe, parts of Latin America. The data do not show global extinction in the coming decades.
They show something else: official fertility projections in ageing countries have been systematically too optimistic, and the small generations already born lock in a shrinking workforce for the next 20–30 years.
Projections do not err in one direction only: Japan's 2006 projection ran below actual for years, and Korea's 2021 and 2023 projections came in below actual fertility in 2024–2025.
Method & sources
UN World Population Prospects 2024: estimates 1950–2023, projections 2024–2100 (medium and low variants, 95% interval), age structure.
National statistics: actual births and fertility 2015–2025 (provisional 2025 and early-2026 data for some countries).
Archived official projections: IPSS (Japan), Statistics Korea, Taiwan NDC, UN, SSA and the Census Bureau (US), ONS, Eurostat, Destatis, ISTAT, Statistics Finland and Canada, the Australian Treasury, Rosstat.
Actual population, births and fertility: UN WPP 2024 estimates to 2023. Births and fertility come from national statistics from the last year they matched the UN estimate (within 5% two years running): the UN's figures for the latest years are partly a projection themselves. Series of a different coverage or definition (e.g. France with its overseas departments, Singapore's resident fertility, incomplete registration, surveys) are not joined to the UN series. Economy: values of the latest IMF edition; World Bank indicators: published values.
Older UN revisions projected five-year periods (1 July to 30 June five years later). They are compared with a weighted mean of annual facts: the first and last calendar years weigh ½, the years between weigh 1.
UN gap: actual divided by projected, minus 1. IMF gap for rates (growth, inflation, debt, unemployment): difference in percentage points.
Facts get revised too: UN 2024 estimates of past years differ from what statistics published back then. Projections are compared with the best estimate available today.
In-depth checks of national projections (Japan, Korea, Italy and others), US energy and the Federal Reserve are above on this page.