Russia’s 2022 budget assumed inflation of 4.0%. The outcome: 11.9%
Russia: inflation, December over December
The misses go both ways: over 17 years inflation came in above the assumption 12 times, below 5.
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Each autumn, with the draft budget, the government publishes its base forecast: the dollar rate, the oil price, growth and inflation for the next three years. Budget revenue is computed on these assumptions. Here: the assumptions for the next year against the outcome.
By year: blue, what the budget assumed for that year (the forecast made a year earlier); orange, the outcome. The shading is the error.
- 2009: assumed → outcome
8.5% → 8.8%
- 2010: assumed → outcome
10.0% → 8.8%
- 2011: assumed → outcome
6.5% → 6.1%
- 2012: assumed → outcome
6.0% → 6.6%
- 2013: assumed → outcome
5.5% → 6.5%
- 2014: assumed → outcome
5.0% → 11.4%
- 2015: assumed → outcome
5.5% → 12.9%
- 2016: assumed → outcome
6.4% → 5.4%
- 2017: assumed → outcome
4.0% → 2.5%
- 2018: assumed → outcome
4.0% → 4.3%
- 2019: assumed → outcome
4.3% → 3.0%
- 2020: assumed → outcome
3.0% → 4.9%
- 2021: assumed → outcome
3.7% → 8.4%
- 2022: assumed → outcome
4.0% → 11.9%
- 2023: assumed → outcome
5.5% → 7.4%
- 2024: assumed → outcome
4.5% → 9.5%
- 2025: assumed → outcome
4.5% → 5.6%
The Ministry of Finance’s budget policy guidelines (2009–2026), the 2009 budget law and the Ministry of Economic Development’s 2015 scenario: base case, value for the next year. Outcome: the rate, the average of the Bank of Russia’s official rates; Urals, the Ministry of Economic Development’s reported figures; GDP growth, IMF data (April 2026, from Rosstat); inflation, the Bank of Russia, December over December.
A budget assumption is not a promise nor the Bank of Russia’s forecast: it is what revenue was computed on. Misses both ways show on the chart.
A question for this picture
What happens to a budget when its assumption misses reality by tens of percent?